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SOCIAL FUNCTION AND VALUE CAPTURE: 
DO THEY OR SHOULD THEY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY 
IN POLISH LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
1. INTRODUCTION: THE CURIOUS CASE OF WARSAW
A U.S. visitor in Warsaw can feel alarmingly at home. Unlike many other cit-
ies in Eastern Europe – Budapest, Prague and Krakow, for example – Warsaw’s 
urban fabric is uneasily familiar. The capital city – not unlike U.S. mega-regions 
like Atlanta or Dallas, for example – evidences the same disconcerting pattern of 
urban sprawl, aided by automobile dependence and a host of other, well-known 
and mostly negative consequences for the physical and built environment1. Even 
the beautifully reconstructed historic center, lovely as it is, recalls some of the 
most frequently voiced concerns about U.S. urban redevelopments in cities like 
New York – with its South Street Seaport – or of Los Angeles’s old downtown – 
creating havens of relative privilege and neighborhoods that are nice to look at but 
do not much resemble vibrant urban districts that embrace a true cross-section of 
the city’s urban residents, activities and characteristics2.
What is it about Warsaw?3. Again like many U.S. cities, and particularly the 
“Sunbelt” cities of the south and southwest that saw such rapid and often uncon-
1 See generally, e.g., A. Duany, E. Plater-Zyberk, J. Speck, Suburban Nation: the Rise of 
Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream, New York 2010.
2 See, e.g., L. Adamic, A. Sekula, Facing the Music: Documenting Walt Disney Concert 
Hall and the Redevelopment of Downtown Los Angeles, Los Angeles 2015 (on Los Angeles); 
J. M. Lindgren, Preserving South Street Seaport: The Dream and Reality of a New York Urban 
Renewal District, New York 2014 (on New York City).
3 In this we recall Julian Juergensmeyer’s similar query about Atlanta. See Foreword: an 
Introduction to Urban Sprawl, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 2001, No. 17, p. 923.
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trolled growth after the Second World War4, Warsaw’s land development since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union indicate that it was the product of a comparable 
period of economic expansion in which social and environmental concerns were 
often subordinated to the interests of capital accumulation5. Although this is not 
an original story, it is nonetheless one for concern.
Following this introductory Part I, in Part II, two of the three authors here, 
both U.S. law professors, seek to identify some conceptual and practical legal 
tools for a more orderly and balanced land use development in the Warsaw met-
ropolitan region, one that promotes not just economic and industrial growth but 
one that also serves medium- and longer-term social and environmental interests 
as well. Part III, written by the third author – a Polish law professor, will evaluate 
the prospects for, as well as the challenges and impediments to, implementing 
these legal tools in the Polish context. Finally, in Part IV we offer some conclud-
ing observations.
2. LEGAL TOOLS FOR WARSAW’S LAND USE FUTURE?
2.1. SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY
In 1911, the French jurist León Duguit gave a series of six lectures in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, in which he outlined recent evolutions in his legal philosophy6. 
In the last of those lectures he articulated his view of the social function of prop-
erty7. What has come to be known as the social function doctrine has been enor-
mously influential – not only in Duguit’s native France and in Argentina, where 
he gave the lectures, but across most of the civil law world8. 
By contrast, one of the first principles of property law learned by most U.S. 
law students is the idea that the greatest right possessed by a holder to title of 
property is that he or she has the right to exclude. This idea is central to a view 
of property that vests the owner with the power to use and control the property as 
he or she wishes, subject only to external limits on that use. The external limits, 
4 See generally, e.g., K. T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United 
States, New York 1985.
5 See, e.g., J. Goldman, Warsaw; Reconstruction as Propaganda, (in:) L. J. Vale, T. J. Cam-
panella (eds.), The Resilient City; How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster, New York 2005, pp. 
135–158.
6 S. R. Foster, D. Bonilla, The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 
Fordham L.R. 201, No. 80, p. 1003.
7 L. Duguit, Las transformaciones del Derecho Público y Privado, Buenos Aires 1975.
8 See, e.g., M. García-Villegas, Comparative Sociology of Law: Legal Fields, Legal 
Scholarships, and Social Sciences in Europe and the United States, Law & Soc. Inquiry 2006, 
No. 31, p. 343.
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enforced by the formal legal system, are created in order to respect the corre-
sponding property use of others. Thus, for example, I may use my land as I wish 
but if, say, I build a water reservoir on my land and the reservoir bursts, causing 
damage to my neighbor’s land, I am responsible for the extent of the damage9.
Duguit’s idea of property’s social function turned this highly individualis-
tic notion on its head. In brief, Duguit argued that property was not something 
that, in the prevailing liberal tradition, entitled the title-holder to do whatever he 
wanted with his property so long as he did not infringe on the property rights 
of others. On the contrary, by virtue of the fact that human beings are by nature 
social creatures who live together in societies, Duguit, said, property by defini-
tion was subject to internal limits. That is, Duguit believed that property had to 
respect not just the immediate needs of its owner but also those of other members 
of society. First and foremost, as a result, property could not be allowed to be held 
and remain unproductive; property had to produce value10. This was true, Duguit 
believed, once again, because property exists not just to enrich the owner but the 
entire society. Unproductive property hurts us all, he would say, because it inhib-
its the ability of society to develop as fully as one would wish. To use his idea in a 
somewhat anachronistic way, this is to argue, for instance, in the language of law 
and economics, that property ownership necessitated using the property in the 
most economically efficient manner possible because this would, by extension, 
create the greatest social utility.
Importantly, however, Duguit was, beyond the central claim about the internal 
limits to ownership that characterized property’s social function, less than clear 
about what behaviors by property owners would satisfy their social obligations. 
That is, he did not argue, for example, that the social function meant that a pri-
vately held forest reserve always remain a forest because, say, what we today call 
greenspace contributes to the productive use of a clean environment. Conversely, 
he did not argue that, for example, rented property had to remain such forever, 
even when a city had a housing deficit. On the contrary, the land had merely to be 
“productive”. Thus, Duguit’s theory did not per se prevent urban renewal, even 
when it may end up displacing some persons11. What Duguit’s theoretical frame-
work did do was provide an intellectual legal frame that balanced the individual 
rights of use and exploitation against the collective need for mutually beneficial 
uses.
At this point, two observations deserve making. First, Duguit’s writing very 
much demonstrates that he was acutely conscious of the need to respond to the 
world’s relatively recent industrial transformation and then growing urbaniza-
 9 As famously explored in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1865-66) L.R. 1 Ex. 265; 
[1865-66] All E.R. Rep. 1; (1866) 4 Hurl. & C. 263 (Ex Chamber), affirmed by Rylands v Fletcher, 
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (HL).
10 S. R. Foster, D. Bonilla, The Social Function of Property…, p. 1007.
11 Ibidem, pp. 1007–1009.
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tion12. His theory of property’s social function gave voice to a recognition that 
individualistic property holding notions did not well serve dense and intensive 
land use. Given that we are now a majority urban planet, with the global popula-
tion expected to be over two-thirds urban by 203013, his concerns are thus even 
more relevant in 2015 than they were a century ago. Second, Duguit’s notion of 
property’s social function was neutral with respect to the type of productive use 
to which property should be put.
As indicated above, Duguit’s idea has had a lot of traction since he first elab-
orated it. Property’s social function is an idea that, for example, now has con-
stitutional protection in a number of countries14. Moreover, in many places, the 
content of the productive use has been defined, either by legislation or by judicial 
decision or by a combination of the two. In Colombia, the constitution provides 
not only that property must observe its social function but also that the inherent 
limits on property include an ecological function15. Elaborating that conceptual 
extension, the Colombian Constitutional Court has, for example, restricted the 
rights of owners with private property within the boundaries of declared national 
parks to dispose of and use their property as they see fit, citing the larger pub-
lic interest16. It is fair to say that in many if not most instances, that the mod-
ern interpretation of property’s social function uses its view of internal limits to 
restrain and limit uses in service of collective goals beyond merely assuring that 
property is “productive”17.
Curiously, however, the notion of property’s social function appears to have 
had little influence in post-Soviet Poland18. This is surprising for at least three 
reasons. First, one of the features of economic development in Soviet-influ-
enced Eastern Europe was the heavy toll it took on the environment and the 
lives of the people who lived there19. In Poland, one of the more industrial-
ized countries under Soviet influence, the social-environmental consequences 
of the Soviet period were especially serious and required intervention to cor-
12 See, e.g., L. Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, Vol. 3: La Théorie Génerale de l’État, 
Paris 1930, pp. 658–674 (on necessary changes in property law in the modern world).
13 UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund], State of World Population 2007: Unleasing the 
Potential of Urban Growth, New York 2007, pp. 6–8.
14 S. R. Foster, D. Bonilla, The Social Function of Property…, p. 1008.
15 H. Alviar García, C. Villegas del Castillo, La Función Social de la Propiedad en las 
Constituciones Colombianas, Bogotá 2012, pp. 63–77.
16 Sentencia [Decision] C-189 of 2006, at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
relatoria/2006/C-189-06.htm. 
17 See, e.g. supra, pp. 135–167.
18 Lecture by Dr. D. Sześciło, Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Warsaw, 
Influence of ‘Participatory Funds’ on Redevelopment of Warsaw, University of Warsaw, June 18, 
2015. 
19 See, e.g., D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands: the Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction, 
Boulder, Colorado 1993.
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rect them20. Second, the explosive economic growth that has characterized the 
post-Soviet period in Poland, and above all in Warsaw21, call out for guiding 
principles to help balance and restrain that growth’s undesirable effects, such as 
sprawl. Third, Duguit’s notion of property’s social function was in fact a direct 
response to socialist ideology. Remember that Duguit delivered his famous 
lectures early in the second decade of the 20th century; the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution was six years away. Debates about socialism were the intellectual 
electrical current of the era22; they could not be avoided by a serious legal the-
orist. Duguit’s theory was thus in part an effort to articulate an intellectually 
coherent legal response to socialism. His was an attempt, within a capitalist, 
free-market context, to recognize collective needs, so as to damper some of 
capitalism’s harsher social effects23.
For all of the above reasons, one would have thought social function theory 
would be attractive to Poland. Like Soviet occupation or not, collectivist notions 
made their way into the political and legal consciousness24. Social function theory 
provides ideas that respect collective needs but also with a legal theory designed 
to work within a free-market system that respects individual rights. Furthermore, 
as indicated above, a contemporary articulation of social function theory would 
provide a coherent legal theory both to address negative social and environmental 
consequences of the Soviet period and also help control the post-Soviet growth.
Consider, for instance, a famous Warsaw land use example. In front of the 
Stalinist Palace of Culture in central Warsaw sit several large parcels – today 
devoted exclusively to parking. Among those concerned about land use, the par-
cels constitute a particular waste of space and an opportunity for densification in 
the city center (not to mention being a real eyesore). They cry out for a – in Dugu-
itian terms – more productive use. Social function theory would in this instance 
provide a legal theory to push for a denser, more broadly beneficial use of that 
space. Similarly, social function theory could help Warsaw’s population control 
sprawl. It would provide a legal theoretical framework to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of sprawl that embraces not only economic concerns but also social and 
political ones. This would be true for discussion about transportation infrastruc-
ture as well since social function theory would provide a forum and impose a legal 
requirement to consider the consequences of unbridled car dependence and seek 
20 See, e.g., M. Nowicki, Environment in Poland: Issues and Solutions, Dordrecht 1993, 
pp. 15–30.
21 G. Gorzelak, M. Smetkowski, Warsaw as a metropolis – successes and missed opportunities, 
Regional Science Policy and Practice 2012, Vol. 4, No. 1.
22 See, e.g. R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, New York 1974, pp. 261–275.
23 S. R. Foster, D. Bonilla, The Social Function of Property…, p. 1009. See generally K. Marx, 
Capital, Vols. 1–3, New York 1992.
24 See, e.g. B. Porter-Szücs, Poland in the Modern World: Beyond Martyrdom, Oxford 2014, 
pp. 328–340.
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alternatives that would benefit the entire population and not merely cater to the 
convenience of single drivers.
2.2. LAND VALUE CAPTURE
Another approach to land development regulation that is found in many coun-
tries but which seems at best underutilized in Poland is the concept of land value 
capture: “Value capture refers to the recovery by the public of the land value incre-
ments (unearned income…) generated by the actions other than the landowner’s 
direct investments (…). Although all such increments are essentially unearned 
income, value capture policies focus primarily on the increment generated by 
public investments and administrative actions, such as granting permission for 
the development of specific land uses and densities. The objective is to draw 
on publicly generated land value increments to enable local administrations to 
improve the performance of land use management and to fund urban infrastruc-
ture and service provisions. The notion is that benefits provided by governments 
to private landowners should be shared fairly among all residents”25.
The concept is broad and applied to many different ways that land use control 
authorities require new development to bear the cost – partially or completely, 
although usually the former- of the infrastructure needs created by the new devel-
opment. The idea is by no means new. For example, requirements that land own-
ers contribute to the cost of public improvements that benefit their land can be 
found in the Roman Empire, and in Portugal, Spain, France, England and Mex-
ico as early as the 1500s and 1600s26. In modern Spain, Catalonia in particular, 
land value capture is used to fund the provision of affordable housing27. In Latin 
America, where land value recapture has seen the most widespread adoption, 
a wide range of traditional and social infrastructure is financed by recapture of 
the increased value received by land accorded development permission28.
25 M. Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for Urban 
Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2013. “In Spain, municipalities capture part of the value 
increase in urban extension areas by requiring landowners to cede between 5 and 15 percent of the 
serviced building plots to the municipality. In addition, landowners must provide the land needed 
for infrastructure, pay the related costs for service provision, and pay the overhead costs and a 
profit margin”. Ibidem, p. 14.
26 Ibidem.
27 J. C. Juergensmeyer, Developer Funding of Affordable and Work Force Housing Through 
Impact Fees and Land Value Recapture: A comparison of American and Spanish Approaches, Re-
vista de Derecho Urbanistico y Medio Ambiente 2015, No. 297, p. 131; N Calavita, J. Clusa, S. Mur, 
C. Wiener, Spain’s Constitutional Mandates: The Right to Housing, Land Value Recapture, and In-
clusionary Housing, Chapter 7, (in:) N. Calavita, A. Mallach, Inclusionary Housing in Internation-
al Perspective: Affordable Housing, Social Inclusion and Land Value Rcapture, Milwaukee 2010.
28 On the Latin American example, see, e.g. M. Smolka, D. Amborski, Value Capture for 
Urban Development: An Inter-American Comparison, Lincoln Land Institute working paper, 
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One land value capture study focused on Latin America identifies three cate-
gories of the voluntary and mandatory implementation of the concept: 1) “ property 
taxation and betterment contributions;” 2) exactions and other direct negotiations 
for charges for building rights or for the transfer of development rights;” and 3) 
“large-scale approaches such as development of public land through privatization 
or acquisition, land readjustment, and public auctions of bonds for purchasing 
building rights”29.
While most studies of the application of land value capture techniques have 
centered on Latin America, Western Europe, and, to a lesser degree, the United 
States, a recent conference and case studies have focused on Sub Saharan Africa. 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe have been objects of studies and great interest is 
being expressed in South Africa30.
In the United States and Canada the use of land value capture normally occurs 
without the use of the term and accomplished rather differently and in ways that 
may be easier for Polish cities to adopt. The U.S.-based organization, the Lin-
coln Institute of Land Policy, has long advocated the consideration of land value 
capture per the Latin American model. In a recent newsletter the Lincoln Insti-
tute reported: “The concept of value capture, which recognizes the increases in 
property value triggered by government action and public investments, has been 
in the news of late, not coincidentally right here in our backyard. The Massa-
chusetts transportation secretary, Stephanie Pollack, floated the idea as a way of 
confronting cost overruns in the proposed Green Line light rail extension north 
of Boston. The state has established a Value Capture Commission to explore 
ways of engaging the private sector in the financing of critical transportation 
infrastructure. The City of Cambridge similarly suggested that private developers 
and landowners might contribute more directly to transit operations that are such 
a critical element in the success of such booming areas as Kendall Square: “Our 
research on value capture in the context of land-based financing tools goes back 
many years, and the idea has a prominent place in the promotion of municipal 
fiscal health. Martim Smolka, director of the Program on Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and author of the report Implementing Value Capture in Latin 
America, has been conducting research, courses, lectures, and workshops, most 
recently in São Paulo, where additional floor-area ratio (FAR) is auctioned in 
a stock market. Those discussions have centered on several common concerns in 
the implementation of value capture, such as whether charges to property owners 
are passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices, or doubts about the 
2007, at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1279_Value-capture-for-Urban-Development. On land 
value capture in general, see, e.g., G. K. Ingram, Y.-H. Hon, Value Capture and Land Policies, 
Cambridge 2012. 
29 See M. Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin America…
30 At http://www.africancentreforcities.net/land-value-capture-and-infrastructure-finance-
in-sub-saharan-africa/.
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ability of local officials to determine the precise land value increment linked to 
government action”31.
Even though classic value capture may indeed be “catching on” the most 
important implementation of the concept in the Unites States had been develop-
er-funding requirements tied to impact analysis based required dedications and 
impact fees32.
One of the key tenets of US land development regulation law since the incep-
tion of growth management programs has been submitting development propos-
als to an impact analysis– a concept no doubt borrowed from the Environmental 
Impact Statement process established by the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969. The impact analysis measures the effect of the proposed development on 
the need for infrastructure to service that new development. At first the infra-
structure considered was so called “hard” infrastructure, for example, roads, 
parks, schools, and public buildings. Now, however, various items of environmen-
tal protection infrastructure and social infrastructure such as affordable housing 
and childcare facilities are included. Since the developer is required to pay for 
infrastructure out of his potential profit from the new development, the result is 
a capture of a portion of the increased value the developer receives as a result of 
obtaining development permission.
Conceptually, value capture programs such as impact fees are grounded in 
the idea of using windfalls33 landowners receive from obtaining development 
permission to mitigate the wipeouts suffered by landowners negatively affected 
by new development or the denial of development permission or negative con-
sequences suffered by society in general. There has been much emphasis in the 
U.S in recent years on programs designed to compensate landowners negatively 
affected by land use controls but virtually no attention has been paid to the 
question of capturing for the public any portion of the gains conferred on land-
owners by virtue of public improvements and government regulations. Those 
few who have considered the equity – or lack thereof – involved in granting 
windfalls but not compensating for wipeouts often cite the writings of Henry 
George’s classic work Progress and Poverty and the late 20th century publica-
tions of one of America’s best known land use control law scholars, Donald 
Hagman. In 1978 Professor Hagman and Dean Misczynski published, through 
the American Planning Association, a collection of essays titled Windfalls for 
31 At Lincoln House; the blog of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, September 24, 2015, p. 2, 
at http://www.lincolninst.edu/news-events/at-lincoln-house-blog.
32 Although U.S. impact fees are seldom, if ever, identified as embodying a land value capture 
approach, it is interesting to note that a leading authority on Land Value Capture describes U.S. 
Impact fees as a land value capture approach. M. Smolka, Implementing Value Capture in Latin 
America…
33 The U.S. concept of windfalls bears close resemblance to the British concept of “betterment”. 
See English Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Uthwatt Committee), Final 
Report. Cmd., No. 6386, 1942.
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Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation34. Professor Hagman was 
more concerned with using windfall recapture as a source of wipeout mitigation 
than he was with using value capture to fund public projects. He nonetheless 
noted that under such a program, the community is only asking for a return of a 
portion of the wealth it creates.
It also should be noted, as indicated earlier, that the popular U.S. concept 
of transferable development rights is and should be considered a type of value 
capture: “TDR programs separate the development potential of a parcel from the 
land itself, and create a market where that development potential can be sold”35. 
Pursuant to such programs, Hagman’s goals are more closely realized since those 
who experience a windfall in value as a result of government regulation directly 
compensate individual landowners who have a “wipeout” of land value.
The synthesizing concept underlying a social function view of property and 
land value capture programs is the basic growth management tenet requiring devel-
opment to pay for at least some of its infrastructural, environmental and social impacts. 
Nearby landowners and the tax-paying public are thereby protected from suffering wipe-
outs while new development reaps only windfalls. As noted above, the late Don-
ald Hagman advocated capturing windfalls from developers whose land gained 
value as a result of government development permitting in order to compensate 
landowners whose land lost economic value in the process. While current land 
value capture programs do not usually contemplate the transfer of captured prof-
its to individuals, except in connection with TDR programs, they implement the 
windfalls for wipeouts principle by relieving the tax-paying public from bearing 
the costs of providing new infrastructure or absorbing the cost by experiencing 
lower levels of service.
 We suggest that Polish local governments – even if they are unwilling to adopt 
social function theories and traditional land value-capture programs- should at 
least require new development to search for legal and regulatory mechanisms 
that will take larger, collective property interests into account, such as requir-
ing developers to provide or pay for the infrastructure needs they create through 
infrastructure funding programs analogous to U.S. impact fees and transferable 
development rights programs. 
34 D. Hagman, D. Misczynski, Windfalls For Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compen-
sation, Chicago 1978. A summary of their principal points can be found at J. C. Juergensmeyer, 
T. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Development Regulation Law, 3rd ed., St Paul 2012, pp. 81–89.
35 Ibidem.
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3. OPPORTUNITIES, BARRIERS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR MORE 
SOCIALLY MINDED POLISH LAND USE LAW AND REGULATION
3.1. THE NOTION OF SOCIAL FUNCTION IN POLAND
In order to understand the current approach to social function of property in 
Poland, we need to refer to the past experiences. In the Communist era, the issue 
of property was one of the central elements of the constitutional regulation. The 
Constitution of People’s Republic of Poland adopted in 1952 enshrined individual 
property right and formally guaranteed its protection36. However, the protection of 
property of the state (called as “the property of the whole nation”) was explicitly 
prioritized37. State property was not only differentiated from private protection, 
but also provided with special protection. This naturally created imbalance where 
the state property was deemed superior to private property. What is more, the pro-
tection of the private property of land, buildings and other means of production 
was guaranteed to the extent envisaged in legislation38. In practice, this meant that 
private property could have been limited or ceased at any time by ordinary laws. 
Obviously, this model of relations between private and state property was not 
acceptable in the context of a newly democratic society. Therefore, the Consti-
tution adopted in 1997 introduced a new approach to this issue that is generally 
compatible with international standards. First of all, private property is declared 
to be one of the pillars of the economic system of the Republic of Poland based 
on the doctrine of social market economy39. Everyone has a right to property 
that is correlated with the obligation of the state authorities to protect peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions40. Expropriation may be allowed solely for public pur-
poses and for just compensation41. The right of ownership may only be limited 
by means of a statute and only to the extent that it does not violate the substance 
of such right42. This model of property rights is particularly similar to the one 
reflected in the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights43. 
Firstly, it enacts the general right to private property. Secondly, it specifies key 
rules regarding deprivation of property. Thirdly, it recognizes the conditions for 
imposing other limitations of property rights. 
36 Article 18 of the 1952 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland, Official Journal 
1976, No. 7, item 36.
37 Article 12 of the 1952 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland.
38 Article 17 of the 1952 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland.
39 Article 20 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
40 Article 21.1 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
41 Article 21.2 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
42 Article 64.3 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
43 Protocol to the Convection for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 
open for signature on 20 March, 1952.
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The Constitutional Tribunal underlined that under the new Constitution the 
state property does not enjoy special protection and return to the system based 
on the domination of state property is excluded44. On the other hand, the consti-
tutional order does not provide for total supremacy of private property rights. 
Limitations to private property rights are allowed and deprivation of the right to 
ownership is also possible in order to protect or realize public interest. What is 
more, the Constitutional Tribunal explicitly referred to the concept of social func-
tion of private property. The Tribunal observed that: “(…) contemporary legal 
doctrine rejects the idea that the right to private property, especially land and 
buildings property, is designed to protect solely the egoistic interest of the owner. 
No one today undermines the social aspect of ownership. The consequence of 
this recognition is to accept that ownership is not absolute, but may be subject to 
restrictions. Under Polish law this idea found expression in the very definition of 
property rights. In accordance with Article 140 of the Civil Code, all rights of the 
owner are limited by laws, rules of social coexistence and socio-economic destiny 
of the law. (…) Constitutional legal basis for restrictions on the right of ownership 
is Article 64.3 of the Constitution. In many judgments (…) the Tribunal took the 
view that limitations to the private property rights are acceptable if they do not 
constitute a violation of the essence of property rights, and their implementation 
is justified by the need to protect or realize other constitutional values”45.
In the light of Polish constitutional jurisprudence, then, the right to private 
property is not absolute and might be correlated with limitations and obligations 
based on public interest needs. The social function of private property is therefore 
accepted in practice if not in name as one of the components of the Polish consti-
tutional conception of property rights. This is reflected in the legislation defining 
the scope of the right to ownership. The question nonetheless arises as to why it 
is so difficult to ensure the practical application of the idea of social function of 
property in Poland. 
Our paper does not offer comprehensive explanation to this dilemma, but it 
sheds light on some specific obstacles for dissemination of this concept. We focus 
primarily on barriers created in the legislation. It should be noted though that 
significant problems result from political, social and ideological attitude towards 
property rights. The era of forced collectivism and undermining individual rights 
and freedoms triggered counter-reaction based on supremacy of private prop-
erty, absolutization of individual ownership rights and ignoring any potential 
obligations of the owners towards the larger society. This type of reaction was 
exacerbated by the extremely low levels of trust in state and public institutions 
following the end of Communism, what undermines social and political support 
for any limitations to the property rights. As a result, the doctrine of “inviolable 
44 The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 21 March, 2000, signature K 14/99.
45 The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 15 March, 2005, signature K 9/04.
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and sacred”46 private property is strongly represented today in Polish political and 
social discourse and these views subsequently find expression in public policies 
and legislation. 
3.2. A MOVE TOWARDS VALUE CAPTURE IN POLISH LAND LAW?  
SOME PRELIMINARY STEPS
Despite general reluctance to a socially-oriented concept of property rights, in 
Polish legislation we can identify arrangements demonstrating some perception 
of non-individual repercussions of land use. Key aspects of the land property legal 
regime are regulated in the 2003 Law on Spatial Planning47. This law requires 
public authorities to seek the balance between needs and rights of public persons 
and the public interest in the context of land use48. Specific instruments relevant to 
rights and obligations of owners of private land are established by the provisions 
regulating the content and effects of local spatial plans adopted by communal 
councils. Local spatial plans may impose detailed restrictions to property rights, 
especially to the right to land development (construction) perceived as component 
of property. Those restrictions may concern, for instance, excluding construction 
rights or establishing specific conditions such as, for example, maximum surface, 
height, number of floors and other, similar requirements. However, introduction 
of any restrictions has to be compensated by the municipality by paying compen-
sation or buyout of the relevant property49.
In case of improving legal conditions of land use (e.g. ceasing previous restric-
tions to land development) as a result of adoption of a new local spatial plan, the 
municipality may require the owner to pay one-off fee. This fee is calculated as 
a percentage of the increase of market value of property resulting from the new 
plan. However, it needs to be underlined that this fee might be imposed only when 
the owner sells the relevant property. This mechanism, called a “planning rent”50 
cannot be perceived as a form of impact fee in the sense described in Part II 
above, as it is not directly linked with increasing demand for public infrastructure 
and it is not imposed in conjunction with specific land development project. Also, 
the municipal revenues from planning rent do not have to be allocated to develop-
ment of public infrastructure in the area where the fee was imposed.
Another mechanism, more compatible with the concept of impact fee, is the 
“adjacent fee” regulated by 1997 Law on Property Management51. An adjacent 
46 As declared by the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights.
47 Law of 27 March 2013 on Spatial Planning, Official Journal 2003, No. 80, item 717.
48 See, e.g., Article 6.2 of the 2003 Law on Spatial Planning
49 Article 36 of the 2003 Law on Spatial Planning.
50 E. Janeczko, Renta planistyczna na tle art. 36 ustawy o zagospodarowaniu przestrzennym, 
Rejent 2001, p. 40.
51 Law of 21 August 1997 on Property Management, Official Journal 1997, No. 115, item 741.
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fee is imposed according to the principles established by the Municipal Council 
if the property has been connected to the new “technical infrastructure”, mean-
ing roads and other facilities such as water supply, sewage, heating, electricity, 
gas and telecommunications transmission networks built from public funds. The 
adjacent fee might be imposed when the infrastructure is ready to be connected to 
the relevant property. However, the term “technical infrastructure” does not cover 
infrastructure necessary for provision of human services, such as, for instance, 
building schools. 
Thus, the adjacent fee has some features of an impact fee, such as a direct 
connection with public infrastructure supporting neighboring land use. However, 
it represents a different model in major aspects. First of all, it is not linked to the 
land development projects initiated by a private owner. Secondly, it is imposed 
after implementation of public infrastructure development projects. As a result, 
the Polish adjacent fee cannot be seen as an instrument for involving private own-
ers into development of public infrastructure that is demanded in a consequence 
of private land development projects. What is more, as the report of the Supreme 
Audit Office shows, the municipalities are inefficient in terms of imposing and 
collecting both planning and adjacent fees52.
In conclusion, it should be underlined that the Polish law does not provide for 
any mechanism explicitly requiring private property owners to participate in the 
costs of fulfilling infrastructural needs generated by the private land development 
projects. Planning fees and adjacent fees are only weak versions of a land value 
capture device and do not guarantee that developers are co-responsible for sus-
tainable development of the areas affected by their projects. On the other hand, 
constitutional order and position of the Constitutional Tribunal does not exclude 
introduction of mechanisms similar to impact fees or of a notion seeking to pro-
tect shared interests, such as Duguit’s notion of the social function of property 
doctrine. The major obstacles remains to be the lack of political will and support 
for such arrangements.
4. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE SOCIALLY INCLUSIVE 
FUTURE FOR POLISH LAND AND PROPERTY LAW
What, then, are the prospects for a more publicly or a more socially minded 
attitude towards private property in Poland? As the above discussion suggests, 
at least in the case of Warsaw, the possibility for a more balanced property and 
land use regime, that is one that balances private and public interests, appears to 
52 Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Ustalanie i egzekwowanie przez gminy województwa warmińsko-
mazurskiego opłaty adiacenckiej oraz opłaty planistycznej, Warsaw 2013.
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have been compromised by the Communist experience. That is, paradoxically, the 
collectivist habits of Communism were tossed aside in post-Communist Poland 
– resulting – again in the case of Warsaw specifically – in an aggressive, highly 
privatized model of land use regulation that has resulted in repeating some of the 
worst, sprawl-like tendencies of many U.S. cities53. For our part, we would urge 
Polish property and land use lawyers, scholars and jurists to rethink this model.
Social function theory and land value recapture devices – the two examples 
we have considered here – provide two obvious vehicles to begin to do that. It 
is our hope that the Polish legal sector can play a role going ahead in trying to 
shape a less highly individualistic property and land use regime, in the interest 
of denser, more controlled growth, a form of growth more likely to promote the 
interest of more than the few.
SOCIAL FUNCTION AND VALUE CAPTURE:  
DO THEY OR SHOULD THEY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY  
IN POLISH LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
Summary
This article presents a discussion between two U.S. and a Polish author about 
devices to promote public interests through private land development and regulation. 
The two U.S. authors document the fact that in many South American and European 
countries the concepts of social function of property and value capture play a central 
role in the government regulation of land development – particularly in urban areas. The 
social function theory of ownership, first popularized by the French jurist Leon Duguit 
in the early part of the 20th century, recognizes private ownership as subject to social 
obligations and the need for mutually beneficial use. Value capture is implemented by 
requiring landowners whose land values are increased through development permission 
granted by government regulatory entities to share some of that increased value with 
the public by funding public infrastructure and paying for developments such as 
affordable housing. In the U.S., neither term is in common usage although mechanisms 
such as impact fees and other development charges that require developer funding of 
infrastructure arguably reflect the influence of comparable concepts. The U.S. authors 
then posed the question to their Polish collaborator of whether social function theories 
and value capture are currently being implemented in Poland. The Polish author explains 
that the current approach to social function theories in Poland is greatly influenced by 
Poland’s experiences under communism, during which state property received special 
protection as compared to private property. After the fall of communism, this distinction 
53 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
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was removed and private property received considerable protection as a pillar of the new 
economic system. However, he points out that this does not undermine the social aspect of 
ownership and that private ownership is not absolute and may be subjected to restrictions. 
In regard to the U.S. approach to value capture through impact fees, the Polish author 
explains that the Polish “adjacent fee” bears slight similarity to impact fees, but it does 
not require private landowners to participate in funding the infrastructure needs created 
by their development. He concludes by observing that while Polish law does not preclude 
adoption of measures similar to impact fees, at present there is neither political will nor 
popular support for such arrangements.
ROLA FUNKCJI SPOŁECZNEJ I VALUE CAPTURE54  
W POLSKIM PRAWIE ZAGOSPODAROWANIA PRZESTRZENNEGO
Streszczenie
Niniejszy artykuł prezentuje poglądy na temat wspierania interesu publicznego 
przez regulacje dotyczące prywatnych podmiotów w kontekście zagospodarowania 
przestrzennego. Amerykańscy współautorzy artykułu zaznaczyli, że w wielu południo-
woamerykańskich i europejskich krajach koncepcje społecznej funkcji własności oraz 
„value capture” odgrywają główną rolę w rządowych regulacjach zagospodarowania 
przestrzennego. W USA żadne z tych pojęć nie jest powszechnie używane, lecz kon-
cepcja „value capture” jest implementowana przez opłaty zwane „impact fees”, które 
zobowiązują dewelopera do finansowania infrastruktury. Autorzy amerykańscy stawiają 
pytanie, czy wspomniane wyżej teorie są obecnie realizowane w Polsce. Polski autor 
wyjaśnia, że obecne podejście do teorii funkcji społecznej jest uwarunkowane doświad-
czeniami Polski z czasów komunizmu, kiedy własność państwowa była szczególnie chro-
niona w stosunku do własności prywatnej. Po upadku komunizmu ten podział zanikł, 
a własność prywatna otrzymała znaczną ochronę jako filar nowego systemu gospodar-
czego. Mimo tej teoretycznej akceptacji funkcji społecznej doktryna “nienaruszalności” 
Prawa własności silnie wpływa na politykę i ustawodawstwo. Polski autor zauważa, że 
nie ma obecnie dość woli politycznej w Polsce do wprowadzenia tzw. impact fees.
54 Land Value Capture to metoda finansowania czy współfinansowania nowych inwestycji 
publicznych w infrastrukturę przez podmioty prywatne (właścicieli nieruchomości), których 
nieruchomości zyskały na wartości dzięki wcześniej poczynionym inwestycjom publicznym, np. 
budowie dróg czy linii kolejowych.
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